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Abstract:    
 
This study makes two main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it tests empirically the relative 
timeliness  of  accrual measures  and  earnings  components  used  as  explanatory  variables in  accrual 
models (“accrual drivers”) regarding the impact of conservatism. Secondly, taking into account the 
empirical  evidence  on  such  a  timeliness,  it  discusses  intuitively  potential  implications  for  the 
specification  of  (traditional)  accrual  models  and  the  quality  of  discretionary  accrual  estimates.  It 
concludes that common accrual models, as Jones (1991), are misspecified. They have a dependent 
variable (accruals) asymmetrically affected by conservatism, and one or more explanatory variables 




Keywords: accruals; accrual models; discretionary accruals; conservatism. 




1.  Introduction 
 
In this study we test empirically the relative timeliness of accrual measures and earnings components 
used  as  explanatory  variables  in  accrual  models  (“accrual  drivers”)  regarding  the  impact  of 
conservatism. In the light of the empirical evidence on such timeliness we next discuss intuitively 
potential  implications  for  the  specification  of  (traditional)  accrual  models  and  the  quality  of 
discretionary accrual estimates. 
 
The conservatism principle relates to the prudence managers have to use in recording expected gains 
and losses, adopting an asymmetric treatment of these earnings components that is more stringent for 
the latter relative to the former. Expected losses (bad news, BN) have to be recognised immediately 
after they become expected, while expected gains (good news, GN) shall be recognised when they 
become  realisable/realised  only.  For  example,  the  expectation  that  a  costumer’s  debt  will  not  be 
received  (“bad  debt”)  implies  that  accounting  shall  recognise  immediately  such  a  loss  (a  BN). 
Conversely, a bad debt already recorded as such that is expected to be total or partly recovered (a GN) 
shall not be recognised until the receipt is realised. Thus, BN have higher timeliness than GN, and the 
impact of conservatism over accruals/earnings is negative.  
 
The evidence available in the literature, e.g. Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006), shows that 
the impact of conservatism is reflected on accruals (ACC), consistent with the intuition (and evidence) 
that cash flows are originated on a realisation basis and thus are not contemporaneously affected by 
conservatism. However, so far the literature misses specific empirical evidence on how conservatism 
affects the timeliness of earnings components commonly used as accrual drivers.  
 
Accrual  models  play  a  central  role  in  accounting  empirical  research,  mainly  in  its  earnings 
management branch. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted in the literature that the available aggregate 
accrual  models  do  not  work  well  in  identifying  earnings  management  practices.  The  models  are 
misspecified and their power is very low (Dechow et al., 1995); they are imprecise in estimating 
abnormal (discretionary) accruals (Guay et al., 1996); a systematic error related to factors as growth, 
cash flow, leverage and earnings smoothing is documented in such accruals estimates (Young, 1999); 
and all of them tend to perform poorly in terms of forecasting accuracy (Thomas and Zhang, 2000). 
All these caveats seem to be enough motivation to foster research leading to a better understanding of 
such models and the quality of their estimates. The current study builds on such a motivation. It seeks 
empirical evidence on conservatism induced timeliness of accrual measures and accrual drivers.  Our 
intuition is that these drivers are originated on a realisation basis and thus are not contemporaneously 
affected by conservatism, in contrast with the asymmetric timeliness of aggregate accruals.  
 
The  empirical  evidence  in  this  paper  supports  such  intuition.  The  main  implication  of  the 
differentiated impact of conservatism on earnings components is that accrual models commonly used 
in  the  literature,  as  Jones  (1991),  are  misspecified.  They  have  a  dependent  variable  (accruals) 
asymmetrically affected by conservatism, and one or more explanatory variables that are not affected 
at all, inducing a non-systematic measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals. Given the 
prominent  role  accrual  models  still  play  in  accounting  research,  this  result  is  of  importance  to 
researchers. 
 
The study proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature and develop the testing 
hypothesis. In section 3 we discuss  the  research  design and  in  section  4  the  sample  selection. In  
 
4 
section 5 we discuss the empirical results and in section the potential implications for the specification 
of accrual models. Finally, in section 7, we summarise the main results and draw a conclusion.  
 
 
2.  An overview of the literature and development of the testing hypothesis  
 
The Jones (1991) model is intended to estimate the portion of accruals that managers intentionally 
used to achieve some pre-determined level of reported earnings (“discretionary accruals”). Although it 
has many caveats, as we mentioned previously, this model still has a leading role in the literature, 
being  one  of  the  most  used  in  empirical  research  (e.g.  Peasnell  et  al.,  2000).  There  is  not  yet 
alternative models able to overcome its limitations and, simultaneously, easy to use. Most of the other 
available solutions are based upon Jones (1991) model, or may be reconcilable with it. Thus, for the 
purpose of the current research, and with no loss of precision or generality, we take the “family” of 
models that fits under the “umbrella” of that model as the benchmark.
  
 
The structure of an accrual model of the type Jones (1991) is based on a single linear equation of the 
form 
(1)  it it it Y ACC e a a + + = 1 0 , 
where ACC is an aggregate measure of accruals, Y is a vector  with one or more earnings components 
(“accrual drivers”, for example “revenue”) aiming to explain the dependent variable, e  is the residual 
of the regression,  0 a  and  1 a  are parameters, t designates the specific period, and i relates to the firm 
(e.g. Jones, 1991; Peasnell et al., 2000).
1  
 
Amongst the drivers most commonly included in accrual models one has revenue and cash received 
(Peasnell et al., 2000), change in sales (Jones, 1991), and expenses (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 
1995). Common to these drivers is the fact that they are expected to be recognised in accounting 
according to the realisation principle. This means that at the moment of their occurrence there is no 
uncertainty  about  their  amounts  and  they  are  not  expected  to  be  (asymmetrically)  affected  by 
conservatism. 
 
Let us return to the example presented above on a bad debt. When such bad news is known accounting 
has  to  recognise  the  amount  of  the  expected  loss  (bad  news)  through  a  provision  for  bad  debt. 
Therefore, in the period of the event accruals are (negatively) affected, contrasting with revenue, sales, 
change in sales or expenses that are not expected to be affected. In the case of good news, neither 
accruals nor the drivers are expected to be affected.  
 
This expected outcome is consistent with the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses behind the 
conservatism principle. Losses (BN) have to be recognised immediately after they become expected, 
while gains (GN) shall be recognised when they become realisable/realised only. It is consistent too 
with the empirical evidence available in the literature (e.g. Basu, 1997, Pope and Walker, 1999, Ball et 
al.,  2000,  amongst  others)  showing  that  the  asymmetric  effect  of  conservatism  impacts  earnings 
exclusively through accruals.
2 
                                                            
1 Eventually Y may also contain a balance sheet variable. For instance, Plant, Property and Equipment used in the 
original Jones (1991) model. Usually the use of a balance sheet variable, aiming to explain the long-term accrual 
Depreciation, implies the use of total accruals as the dependent variable of the model. 
2 Because of BN connection to future events the impact of such type of news will affect not only current but also 




Taking  into  account  the  intuition  discussed  above  and  the  empirical  evidence  available  in  the 
literature,  we  expect  the  dependent  variable  in  equation  (1)  to  be  contemporaneously  (and 
asymmetrically) affected by conservatism, and no (asymmetric) impact on the accrual drivers. We 
state this expectation in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The asymmetric timeliness of good and bad news is expected to hold for accrual measures, 
but not for accrual drivers (earnings components) usually used as independent variables in 
accrual models. 
 




3.  Research design 
 
a.  The timeliness of earnings components 
To test for the impact of conservative accounting over earnings components (accrual drivers) we adopt 
an adjusted version of the solution proposed in Pope and Walker (1999),  
(2)   t t t t t
t
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t  and  t - t D1 = 1 if  0 < -t t RET , zero otherwise.
3 This solution is consistent with 
Basu (1997) and his definition of earnings conservatism, and tests for the contemporaneous effect of 
(market) news on the timeliness of earnings components. Moreover, it has the advantage of allowing 
control for the impact of prior periods.
4  
 
v  is the coefficient on good news. As discussed in Pope and Walker (1999), it is predicted to be 
positive and its size is influenced by the speed at which those news are recognised in earnings. The 
sum  of  the  coefficients  v   and  r   reflects  the  responsiveness  of  earnings  to  bad  news.  The 
asymmetric impact of conservatism on earnings implies  r  to be positive, consistent with the negative 
effect of bad news on accruals. 
 
The variable X is, one at a time, the components used as accrual drivers in some of the most common 
models  (change  in  revenue,  revenue,  cash  received  and  expenses),  three  definitions  of  accruals 
(working capital accruals, total accruals minus depreciation, and long term operating accruals minus 
depreciation), and earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
                                                            
3 This model differs from the one in Pope and Walker (1999) by including a dummy variable (D1) for each of the 
controlling periods. Moreover, the definition we use includes dividends. Performing the analysis for the original 
model does not affect materially the results. 
4 The choice of this model to test the asymmetric impact of conservatism over accrual measures and accrual 
drivers, instead of a model that did not contain control for prior periods, was intended to collect “the best of two 
worlds”: on the one hand, to test for the current period impact (our primary objective); on the other hand, to have 




b.   Variables definition and measurement  
 
i)  Accruals 
We use three definitions of aggregate accruals. They are available in Exhibit 1. Whenever possible, 
their estimation follows the cash flow approach (Hribar and Collins, 2002). Total accruals (TACC) is 
defined with no depreciation charge. There are three main reasons for the exclusion of this expense. 
Firstly, income statement Depreciation tends to reflect normal depreciation only. Secondly, because 
accrual models that use total accruals (inclusive of depreciation charge) have to control for the source 
of depreciation.
5 Thirdly, the visibility and predictability of the depreciation charge make it of limited 
usefulness to be used in managing earnings (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000).   
 
ii) Accrual drivers 
The accrual drivers considered in the analysis have been selected from the models in Peasnell et al. 
(2000), revenue and cash received, Jones (1991), change in revenue, and Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995), expenses. Exhibit 1 contains their definitions. 
 
iii)  Conservatism good and bad news 
We use market returns (RET) as a proxy for information on conservatism. It follows from the testing 
model adopted from Pope and Walker (1999), Ball and Shivakumar (2006) and the seminal work of 
Basu (1997). Our choice cannot be separated from the fact that only a few proxies for good/bad news 
are available in the literature, most of them related to very specific research designs which preclude 
their consideration in the current study (e.g. Guo and Ziebart, 2000; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
6 A 
dummy variable  t D1  that takes value one when  t RET <0 (bad news), zero otherwise, is used as a 
proxy for good/bad news. 
 
 
4.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 describes the sample selection. From the 1999 version of Compustat Primary, Secondary and 
Tertiary, Full Coverage and Research Annual Industrial files we collected all firms. Because prior to 
1987 cash flow from operations (#308) disclosed in the cash flow statement (SFAS 95) is unavailable, 
after lagging variables the sample is defined for the period 1988-1998.
7 As in Barth et al. (2001), a 
different structure of accruals justifies the exclusion of firms belonging to financial industries. This set 
of procedures originated a raw sample with 85,384 firm-years. Variables are all deflated by the fourth 
lag of market value, consistent with the solution in Pope and Walker (1999).
8 After deleting missing 




                                                            
5 For example, by using a balance sheet variable as Property, Plant and Equipment. According to Young (1999) 
this type of models tends to produce discretionary accrual estimates with a larger measurement error. 
6 The use of this proxy in reverse price-earnings relations is not exempt of criticism. However, Moreira (2002: 
Part II, Appendix B) discusses and defends its use. 
7 Because of the role cash flow plays in the estimation of accruals, we decided not to mix balance sheet and 
SFAS 95-cash-flow-data measures of this variable. We tried to avoid potential measurement errors arising from 
using the balance sheet measure (Hribar and Collins, 2002). 
8 We also used a one lag market value in testing for the current period. The results are qualitatively the same. 
9 Performing the analysis for the non-trimmed sample does not affect materially the results.  
 
7 
Table 2, Panel A,  contains  some basic descriptive  statistics for both samples. Earnings (EBEI) is 
slightly skewed to the left, consistent with the evidence in the literature that during the period firms 
have been reporting increasing losses. However, the mean and median are both positive. Conversely, 
the mean of TACC_D is negative, and the median is close to zero. This situation shows some left 
skewness, consistent with the asymmetric conservative recognition of unrealised economic losses and 
gains (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) and common to the samples of other related studies (e.g. Barth et 
al.,  1999;  Thomas  and  Zhang,  2000).    As  expected,  the  change  in  revenue  (DREV)  and  returns 
(RET_0) show some right skewness.  
 
Panel  B  displays  the  correlations  amongst  the  main  variables.  The  highest  correlations  appear  in 
variables that are strongly related in accounting terms as cash received (CR) / REV / expenses (EXP). 
All of them have a correlation close to 100 percent. Accrual measures (TACC_D, LTACC_D and 
WCA) do have  also high  correlation  that  in some  cases surpasses  60  percent.  The  correlation of 
RET_0 with the other variables is fairly small and tends not to surpass 17 percent. It is even smaller 
(around 8 percent) for TACC_D. The correlation of DREV with this variable is fairly low.    
 
The  (untabulated)  structure  of  the  sample  follows  our  expectations  and  the  evidence  from  other 
studies.  As  in  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000),  the  number  of  observations  is  increasing  throughout  the 
period, evolving smoothly from 7.5 percent in 1988 up to 10 percent in 1998.  
In the following section we discuss the main results of the analysis. 
 
 
5.  Empirical results: relative timeliness of accruals and accrual drivers 
 
Table 3 displays the impact of good (GN) and bad news (BN) on earnings, accrual measures, and 
accrual drivers.
10 The evidence it reports is intended to support the discussion above on the relative 
timeliness of aggregate accrual measures and accrual drivers. We use an adjusted version of a model 
from  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  that  tests  the  speed  at  which  prior  period  news  are  recognised  in 
earnings. It controls for the impact of prior period news, and uses market returns as a proxy for news.
11 
Because the evidence from pooled regressions (Panel A) is very similar to that using separate-year 
regressions (Panel B) we only discuss the former.  
 
The numbers reported in the table are the coefficients of the model,
12 and read as it follows. Current 
period  (t) earnings (EBEI, #237) suffer  a  joint impact of  0.126 per  monetary  unit of current BN 
( t BN ),  0.128  per  unit  of  1 - t BN ,  0.119  per  unit  of  2 - t BN   and  0.111  per  unit  of  3 - t BN .  This 
preliminary evidence is consistent with the literature and suggests that the impact of market news 
affects earnings up to three periods later, reflecting the delay of accounting in recognizing news.  
 
                                                            
10 The equations in this table have been regressed by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). The set of equations is 
equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regressions model, due to the correlation of the residuals in such equations. 
Because the explanatory variables are the same in all equations then OLS and GLS (Generalised Least Squares) 
are identical ways of estimating them (Green, 2000:616). 
11 Performing the analysis using industry-based abnormal returns does not change qualitatively the results.  
12 For the sake of parsimony, we do not report the coefficients a. Gnews (GN) and Bnews (BN) coefficients are, 
respectively, w and (w+r). To check each period asymmetrical impact on the dependent variables columns G=B 
make available the results of a statistical test of differences in coefficients (* and ** stands for significance at 
less than 1 and 5 percent, respectively; = stands for coefficients not statistically different from each other; bold 




Looking still over EBEI, in all the periods the impact is statistically larger for BN than for GN, at less 
than one percent, consistent with the asymmetric impact of conservatism (for example, for current 
period, 0.017 and 0.126, for GN and BN respectively). This means that the timeliness of BN is greater 
than that of GN. Given that the proxy for BN is defined in negative terms, the sign of its coefficients is 
in line with expectations. Hence, this type of news makes earnings more negative, or less positive, 
relative to a situation where news are all good. As argued in Pope and Walker (1999), the coefficient 
of GN is expected to increase as the lag increases, reflecting the effective occurrence of the operations 
underlying this type of news. The coefficient shifts sharply from period t to period t-1 (0.017 to 0.06), 
consistent with GN being reflected in earnings (accruals) with one lag, and become quite stable after 
this last period. Contrastingly, the coefficient on BN is expected to decrease as the lag increases, as the 
effect of prior news vanishes.
13 The evidence in the table follows the one in the literature, and supports 
the intuition that BN is recognised in earnings at a higher speed than GN. These results for EBEI 
follow closely those of the US sample in Pope and Walker (1999), and are also consistent with the 
evidence in Basu (1997).  
 
The evolution of the coefficient for TACC_D follows more or less closely that mentioned for EBEI, 
except that for prior periods there is no asymmetric impact and the coefficients for GN and BN tend to 
be statistically equal. This is consistent with the immediate effect of conservatism being translated into 
a contemporaneous asymmetric impact on accruals, but having indirect future impact on cash flows 
that can be potentially related to delayed recognition of BN. Such evolution fits thus the expectations, 
namely  in  showing  no  current  impact  for  GN,
14  consistent  with  this  type  of  news  not  having 
contemporaneous  impact  on  earnings  (accruals).  The  coefficients  on  LTACC_D  for  the  pooled 
regression are broadly consistent with the expectation discussed above that conservatism impacts long 
term  accruals  also.  Hence,  these  results  provide  strong  evidence  that  contemporaneous  accrual 
measures are asymmetrically affected regarding the type of news, consistent with the definition of 
conservatism discussed above and with the intuition underlying the testing hypothesis.  
 
The evidence reported in Table 3 for the accrual drivers (DREV, REV, CR, EXP), usually used as 
explanatory variables in accrual models, shows a different picture from the one discussed for EBEI 
and accrual measures. The impact of news on the drivers tends to be symmetrical, the coefficients on 
GN and BN being not statistically different at conventional levels of confidence. Thus, this evidence is 
supportive of the intuition discussed above that accrual drivers tend to be originated on a realisation 
basis  and  are  not  expected  to  be  (asymmetrically)  affected  by  conservatism.  The  size  of  the 
coefficients on these variables tends to increase with the lag. For instance, the coefficients for REV are 
0.439/0.543 for GN/BN and period t, 0.847/1.037 in period t-3 (the exception to this trend is a slight 
decrease on GN coefficient from period t-2 to t-3). These results are consistent with the evidence in 
Kothari (1992) about prices leading earnings up to three periods. Focusing the analysis strictly in the 
current period, i.e. performing the tests with no control for prior periods and using one lag market 
value as the deflator, the (untabulated) results are similar to those discussed. 
 
The evidence in this table is summarised in Exhibit 2. It strongly supports the testing hypothesis and 
its underlying intuition that the asymmetric impact of conservatism (GN/BN) holds only for accrual 
measures, not for the accrual drivers usually used as explanatory variables in accrual models. This 
                                                            
13  This  expectation  follows  the  assumption  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  that  there  may  be  delayed 
recognition of BN. The empirical evidence in the tables is consistent with such delay being reflected in future 
cash flows. However, such evidence is also consistent with the existence of information in the proxy we use 
(returns) that is not necessarily related to conservatism.   
14 Boldface numbers are not statistically different from zero at less than 5 percent.  
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evidence  suggests  then  that  these  models  are  misspecified  and  their  estimates  may  contain  a 
measurement error. We discuss this issue in the next section. 
 
 
6.  Unequal timeliness for aggregate accrual measures and accrual drivers: implications for the 
specification of accrual models. 
 
a.  The specification of accrual models 
Let us recall the structure of an accrual model of the type Jones (1991) presented above as equation 
(1): 
         it it it Y ACC e a a + + = 1 0 , 
where ACC is an aggregate measure of accruals, Y is a vector  with one or more accrual drivers (for 
instance, revenue) aiming to explain the dependent variable,  e  is the residual of the regression. Its 
parameters (a) can be estimated regressing the model for a given firm using time-series data or, as it is 
currently more common, cross-sectionally for an industry. Using them it is then possible to have an 
estimate of the expected (normal) accruals conditional on the realised values of Y in period t: 
(3)  it it Y CC A 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ a a + = . 
An estimate of discretionary (abnormal) accruals (e ˆ ) is given by: 
(4)  it it it it DAC CC A ACC = = - e ˆ ˆ .
15 
 
Behind this simple way of estimating DAC there are two main assumptions that may potentially affect 
the  quality  of  the  estimates.  Firstly,  Y  is  assumed  not  to  be  affected  by  managers’  discretionary 
actions.
16 Otherwise, the estimated coefficients ( 1 ˆ a ) would be biased and inherently the same would 
happen to the accruals estimates (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995). Secondly, it is assumed that omitted 
variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model. If this does not happen the 
estimation suffers from an omitted-variables-problem, and the coefficients will be biased (Dechow et 
al., 1995; Greene, 2000). 
 
Let us concentrate on the latter assumption. The evidence discussed in the previous section shows that 
the timeliness of ACC regarding good and bad news is asymmetric. Conversely, the type of news does 
not imply differentiated timeliness for accrual drivers (Y). The right hand side of equation (1) misses 
then a variable controlling for such asymmetric impact. However, because this missing variable is not 
correlated to Y there is not an omitted-variable-problem and the coefficients ( 1 a ) are expected to be 
unbiased. Despite this positive outcome DAC estimates might contain a measurement error. 
 
b.  The expected measurement error contained in DAC estimates 
Taking into account managers’ interventions over ACC we split this variable into two components as 
it follows: a discretionary component (DAC), related to managers’ intentional interventions towards 
earnings management; a non-discretionary one (NDAC), related to firms’ normal business activity. It 
can then be written, for a given period:
17 
    (5)  ACC = NDAC + DAC.              
                                                            
15 If the model is estimated in time-series, DAC is the residual of the regression. Otherwise, when estimated 
cross-sectionally by industry, DAC can be understood as a forecast error. 
16 Models using instrumental variables are supposed not to invoke this assumption. Nevertheless, it is not sure 
that they may overcome the problem completely. 




Because of its character, NDAC can be written as a function f that relates this component positively to 
the drivers of normal accruals, for example sales, and negatively to the impact of bad news that related 
to the conservatism principle embodied in the general accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
18 This 
is, 
(6)    NDAC = f (normal accrual drivers ; GAAP conservatism). 
 
The  impact  of  conservatism  on  accruals  is  asymmetric  regarding  the  type  of  news.  BN  impacts 
accruals negatively, and GN tends to have no impact on them. Conversely, as the evidence discussed 
above shows, the impact of news on accrual drivers tends to be symmetrical.  
 
Re-writing expression (1) after adjusting it for equations (5) and (6) allows a perception of the impact 
of conservatism on accrual models. Expression (1) becomes: 
(1’)   NDAC [f (accrual drivers; conservatism)]+DAC =  
= [ ] e a a + +       1 0 drivers accrual Y . 
 
Let  us  discuss  this  specification  issue  based  upon  the  measurement  error  that  may  flow  to  DAC 
estimates from a lack of control for conservatism. If there is no specific control for conservatism on 
the right hand side of that expression, and because accrual drivers are expected to be independent from 
conservatism effects, then the intercept and the error term tend to pick up such effects. DAC estimates 
are thus expected to contain a measurement error.
19 Moreover, this error is different regarding the type 
of news. The intercept of the equation is expected to be higher for firms having GN relative to those 
having BN, consistent with the depressive impact of the latter on accruals. When firms have over time 
both  type  of  news  (potentially  the  most  frequent  case),  or  when  the  model  is  estimated  cross-
sectionally by industry, one may expect that with no control for conservatism the size of the intercept 
will be somewhere in between the extreme cases characterised by having only one type of news. Let 
us  call  this  intercept  the  “average  intercept”.  Given  the  asymmetric  impact  of  conservatism  on 
accruals, we expect this intercept to be underestimated for GN firms and overestimated for BN ones. 
Looking over equations (3) and (4) the implications arising for the estimation of DAC are easy to 
predict. For GN firms the estimate of normal accruals tends to be smaller than it should and DAC 
estimates are expected to be overstated. Contrastingly, for BN firms DAC estimates are expected to be 
understated. Based on these expectations we predict that such error is positive (negative) for good (bad) 
news  firms.
20  This  means  that  the  error  is  not  systematic,  reflecting  the  asymmetric  impact  of 
conservatism. 
 
In sum, the discussion in the current section gives support to the intuition that accrual models are 
misspecified and DAC estimates do contain a non-systematic measurement error. Further research is 
needed to collect evidence intended to test empirically for this intuition. 
 
                                                            
18 E.g. Jones (1991); Basu (1997); Peasnell et al. (2000). 
19 If there are uncorrelated omitted variables then the coefficients of the explanatory variables will be unbiased, 
but the intercept will pick up the mean effect of those omitted variables. 
20 We define the measurement error (ME) as the difference between DAC estimates produced by a model with 
no control (NC) for conservatism and DAC estimates of a model having such a control (C), this is, ME=DACNC 




7.  Conclusion 
 
In  this  study  we  test  empirically  the  relative  timeliness  of  accrual  measures  and  drivers  used  as 
explanatory variables in accrual models, regarding the impact of conservatism. In the light of the 
empirical  evidence  on  such  timeliness  we  discuss  potential  implications  for  the  specification  of 
(traditional) accrual models and the quality of accrual estimates. 
The underlying intuition is that accrual drivers, in the right hand side of the models, are independent of 
conservative accounting effects, but the dependent variable, an accrual measure, is not. The empirical 
evidence  supports  completely  this  intuition.  Accrual  measures  are  asymmetrically  affected  by 
conservatism, showing higher timeliness for BN relative to GN. Conversely, accrual drivers show a 
symmetrical impact regarding the type of news.  
 
This evidence has implications for the specification of accrual models. When models do not contain 
control for conservatism DAC estimates contain a measurement error. For GN firms DAC estimates 
are expected to be overstated, understated for BN. This means that the error is not systematic and 
reflects the asymmetric impact of conservatism on accrual measures. 
 
Thus,  our  results  give  support  to  the  intuition  that  (traditional)  accrual  models  are  misspecified, 
lacking, at least, explanatory variables controlling for conservatism. This conclusion is consistent with 
Healy’s (1996) suggestion that future research should include the impact of conservatism in accrual 
models. Further research is needed to test empirically such intuition.  
 
The evidence in this study, namely that on the timeliness of accrual drivers and its implications for the 
specification of accrual models, is of importance for accounting researchers. We expect it to allow a 
better  perception  of  the  insufficiencies  of  these  models  and,  most  especially,  to  foster  research 
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Table 1: Sample selection. Period 1988/98 
 
 
Description  N. firm-years 
COMPUSTAT (1999) Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary, Full Coverage, 




   
After deleting missing observations  30,670 
After trimming one percent top and bottom of all deflated (by the fourth 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable  MEAN  STD  Q3  MEDIAN  Q1 
EBEI  0.019  0.194  0.089  0.041  -0.019 
TACC_D  -0.007  0.167  0.039  -0.001  -0.044 
LTACC_D  -0.020  0.139  0.010  -0.007  -0.037 
WCA  0.014  0.160  0.049  0.006  -0.028 
CR  2.136  2.721  2.587  1.283  0.599 
REV  2.156  2.745  2.616  1.301  0.606 
EXP  1.972  2.591  2.371  1.142  0.511 
DREV  0.155  0.572  0.237  0.063  -0.018 
RET_0  0.063  0.813  0.271  0.016  -0.212 
 
Notes:  
1)  RET  are  market  returns  estimated  using  Compustat  fiscal-year-end  closing  price  (#199)  and 
dividends per share (#26);  
2)  RET_0  is current change in prices deflated by the fourth lag of share price. Other variables’ 
definition is per Exhibit 1; 




Panel B: Correlations: Pearson (above) / Spearman (below) [27,949 firm-years, deflated by the fourth 
lag of market value] 
 
Variable  TACC_D LTACC_D  WCA  CR  EXP  REV  RET_0  DREV 
TACC_D    0.47  0.64  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.23 
LTACC_D  0.36    -0.38  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.01  -0.17 
WCA  0.67  -0.26    0.15  0.15  0.17  0.09  0.39 
CR  0.07  -0.07  0.11    0.99  0.99  0.10  0.43 
EXP  0.07  -0.07  0.11  0.99    0.99  0.08  0.43 
REV  0.09  -0.08  0.13  1.00  0.99    0.10  0.45 
RET_0  0.09  -0.01  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.12    0.17 
DREV  0.25  -0.15  0.37  0.35  0.34  0.37  0.22   
 
Note: variables’ definition is per Panel A and Exhibit 1. Bold numbers are not significantly different 




Table 3: Contemporaneous impact of good and bad news on earnings components, controlling for prior periods news 
 
Model:        t t t t t
t
t u D RET RET D
P
X




















    
 
 
Panel A: Pooled regressions (Period 1988/98, 27,949 firm-years) 
Current period (t) news   Period t-1 news  Period t-2 news  Period t-3 news  Adj.  Variables 
GNews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B  R2 (%) 
EBEI  0.017  0.126  *  0.060  0.128  *  0.057  0.119  *  0.057  0.111  *  21.1 
TACC_D  0.002  0.049  *  0.041  0.055  =  0.024  0.043  **  0.026  0.026  =  5.9 
LTACC_D  -0.011  0.010  *  0.001  0.002  =  -0.012  0.012  *  -0.005  0.009  =  1.0 
WCA  0.014  0.039  *  0.039  0.052  =  0.036  0.030  =  0.030  0.016  =  7.4 
DREV  0.138  0.149  =  0.158  0.182  =  0.169  0.173  =  0.149  0.146  =  15.9 
REV  0.439  0.543  =  0.739  0.661  =  0.937  0.961  =  0.847  1.037  =  20.9 
CR  0.415  0.515  =  0.715  0.628  =  0.910  0.936  =  0.824  1.022  =  20.4 





Panel B: Separate-year regressions (Mean values for period 1988/98, 27,949 firm-years) 
Current period (t) news  Period t-1 news  Period t-2 news  Period t-3 news  Variables 
GNews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B  Gnews  Bnews  G=B 
EBEI  0.023  0.145  *  0.063  0.134  *  0.065  0.121  *  0.064  0.111  * 
TACC_D  0.003  0.048  *  0.042  0.058  =  0.027  0.045  =  0.028  0.024  = 
LTACC_D  -0.010  0.004  =  -0.005  -0.004  =  -0.014  0.013  *  0.000  0.010  = 
WCA  0.014  0.045  *  0.047  0.054  =  0.041  0.032  =  0.027  0.014  = 
DREV  0.151  0.156  =  0.173  0.176  =  0.182  0.166  =  0.140  0.153  = 
REV  0.554  0.485  =  0.679  0.598  =  0.910  0.921  =  0.968  1.141  = 
CR  0.528  0.453  =  0.650  0.567  =  0.880  0.897  =  0.950  1.128  = 
EXP  0.477  0.328  =  0.566  0.431  =  0.784  0.744  =  0.838  0.976  = 
 
Notes: 
1)  The model is an adjusted version of the solution in Pope and Walker (1999). 













t ; t - t D1 = 1 if  0 < -t t RET , zero otherwise; 
3)  Gnews (Bnews) is the coefficient of the proxy for good (bad) news, w (w+r). Other variables’ definitions are per Exhibit 1; 
4)   * (**) means the coefficients are statistically different from each other at less than 1 (5) percent. “=” indicates that the coefficients are not statistically 
different from each other. Boldface numbers are not statistically different from zero; 
5)  Panel B contains the mean of the yearly coefficients, and the t statistics (untabulated) have been estimated using Fama and McBeth (1973) technique;  





Exhibit 1: Earnings structure and variables’ definition 
 
  Variable  Description  Compustat annual codes 
+  CFO  Cash flow from operations (1987 onwards)  #308 
+  WCA  (non-cash) Working capital accruals  (D#4-D#1)-(D#5-D#34-D#71) 
+  LTACC  Long term operating accruals  #237-#308-WCA 
=  TACC  Total accruals  #237-#308 
=  TACC_D  Total Accruals minus Depreciation  #237-#308+#14 
=  EBEI  Earnings before ext. items disc. operat.   #237 
       
+  CR  Cash received  #12-D#151  
+  DREC  Change in trade receivables  D#151 
=  REV  Revenue (sales)  #12 
-  EXP  Expenses (administrative and selling)  #12-#13 
-  DEP  Depreciation and amortisation  #14 
-  OER  Other expenses net of other revenues  #13-#237-#14 
=  EBEI  Earnings before ext. items disc. operat.   #237 
 
Note:  Compustat  codes:  #1  (cash  and  short-term  investments);  #4  (total  current  assets);  #5  (total 
current liabilities); #34 (debt in current liabilities); #71 (income taxes payable); #13 (operating 






Exhibit 2: Relative timeliness of earnings, accrual measures and accrual drivers 
 
Good News   vs.   Bad News 
Period  Variables 
t  t-1  t-2  t-3 
EBEI  <  <  <  < 
TACC_D  <  =  <  = 
LTACC_D  <  =  <  = 
WCA  <  =  =  = 
DREV  =  =  =  = 
REV  =  =  =  = 
CR  =  =  =  = 
EXP  =  =  =  = 
 
Notes: 
1)  This table shows the relative timeliness of earnings and earnings components, and is based on 
Table 3, panel A; 
2)  Variables’ definition is per Table 2 and Exhibit 1; 
3)   “<” means the variable shows asymmetric timeliness, higher for Bad News and significant at 
less than 5%. “=” means there is no significant difference in timeliness for Good and Bad 
News. 
 